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Dear Reader,

Time and again the geopolitical shifts that continue to take place in the region of Eastern Europe prove that in order to find solutions to complex crises, we need to dig deeper and avoid the simplifications that are offered to us daily, also by some mainstream media outlets. That is why this issue of New Eastern Europe is focused on a very small country that, to most, might seem insignificant.

The country in question is the Republic of Moldova. Our authors try to help explain the processes that are taking place in this former Soviet republic, which today appears to be looking for its place in Europe. Their texts might help you decide if Moldova is indeed the star pupil of Europe’s East, as it is commonly believed in Brussels. Even though we leave the final answer to this question to be still decided on, we are convinced that despite its small size Moldova plays an important role in regards to the future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme and the community’s relations with Russia.

Naturally, no analysis of the situation in Eastern Europe today can avoid the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and how it affects the arena of international politics. The questions of solidarity in regards to Russia’s aggression come first in a text written by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, a Polish member of the European Parliament, who argues Russian action in Ukraine is dividing the EU and the member states need to jointly rethink their relations with Russia. Russian political scientist, Sergey Utkin, counters this argument, stating that the sanctions which are currently placed on Russia will be seen as a pretext to wage an even stronger battle against foreign influences at home.

Specifically on Ukraine, three journalists report on the changes that have taken place in this country since the end of the Yanukovych regime. Sergii Leshchenko investigates today’s whereabouts of Ukraine’s oligarchs while Milan Lelich analyses how the military operation in the east is funded by the Ukrainian people, who continue to have little faith in public institutions and state bureaucracy. Of a different character, is the report by Italian journalist, Edoardo Da Ros, who describes the attitudes of people in Donbas, where pro-Russian separatists are still finding support among some members of the local population. Additionally, the issue offers analyses on Russia and the impact of its recent policies and behaviour.

Lastly, a special section on Oskar Kolberg and the musical faces of Eastern Europe (pages 200-244), which includes a complementary music CD, explores the folk roots of this region and its revival today.

The Editors

In Search of European Solidarity

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski

Following the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing destabilisation in eastern Ukraine, the European Union must now rethink its relations with Russia. The EU should draw a lesson from its shaky unity, which is constantly being challenged by the national interests of individual states during this crucial time.

The recent annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine by Russia has accelerated a reassessment of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership programme, something that has already been on the EU agenda for some time. Through its actions, the Russian Federation has not only hampered the reform process of Ukraine, but also undermined regional stability and disrupted the system of international relations. The consequences of Russian aggression have global implications. It has forced the EU not only to reconsider the effectiveness of its policy, but also to reflect on the consequences of international law, the implications for a wider Europe, as well as on the European Union itself.

Five years young

In 2009 when the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched, the EU aimed to accelerate political association and economic integration with its eastern neighbours. The Association Agreements, which encompass a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), were meant to be a protocol to put the desired transformation into practice. The EaP was also accompanied with a conditional offer of the “visa-wall” abolishment upon fulfilment of specified political and technical requirements. Therefore, this regional policy was to contribute to the global aim pursued by the EU since 2004 – to establish a stable and secure neighbourhood.

Since May 2009 and until today, the countries of the Eastern Partnership have gone through a very turbulent period and the set objectives still remain out of reach. During this time, all six countries have seen a democratic back-slide. The economic situation is rather depressing. The regional security is tense due to the recent Russia-Ukraine crisis, as well as the activation of separatist movements in the area of the protracted conflict hosted by five EaP countries.

Five years down the road, the Eastern Partnership may be viewed as both a glass half empty and a glass half full. On one hand, the EaP has brought some important deliverables. On June 27th 2014, three countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – signed the Association Agreements with the EU. In April 2014, Moldovan citizens who possess biometric passports were granted visa-free travel to the EU. On the other hand, three EaP countries, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, continue to drift away from the EU’s policy, while Belarus and Armenia are losing their independence vis-à-vis Russia-led initiatives.

The biggest weakness of the EU has been its inability to speak with one voice.

Little success can be seen in the EU’s involvement with Belarus. Having failed with sanctions against the non-democratic, ever-lasting president and his official accomplices, but at the same time understanding the need to engage in some dialogue, the European Commission launched new negotiations in early 2014 with Belarus on visa facilitation and readmission agreements. On May 29th 2014, Belarus, along with Russia and Kazakhstan, signed an agreement establishing the Eurasian Economic Union. Regardless of the claims that this is a purely economic union, the political integration and unification of its members will be unavoidable.

Likewise, Armenia was forced to accept questionable security guarantees from Russia. In the summer of 2013, after a major arms deal between Azerbaijan and Russia, the security of Armenia was threatened. Taking into consideration that its state budget is less than the military budget of Azerbaijan, Armenia agreed to join the Russia-led Customs Union and gave up on the already finalised Association Agreement with the EU. Azerbaijan, as earlier mentioned, enjoys strong military co-operation with Russia with no ambition to integrate closer either with Russia or the EU.

Five years since the EaP was launched, we now see a divergence into two groups. The first group, composed of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, has committed to the further integration with the EU. The second, which is made up of Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan are building closer relations with the Russian Federation. In the case of Belarus and Armenia, their participation in the Russia-led projects excludes any further integration projects with the EU.

Ukraine has been a primary focus of the EU’s attention for some time. In late November 2013 the apathy and Ukraine-fatigue of the EU leadership which developed during Viktor Yanukovych’s rule was transformed into admiration towards the Ukrainian youth and students who protested against the governmental decision not to sign the Association Agreement. This admiration was not shared by Yanukovych who ordered the violent dispersal of what the students called the “EuroMaidan”. Through this movement, Ukrainians made their choice for Europe and for this choice many gave their lives during numerous attacks by the riot police and sniper shootings. What they achieved was the fall of the semi-authoritarian regime.

An eye-opener

Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea, which was a direct and blatant violation of numerous international principles and laws, followed by the destabilisation of south-east Ukraine was a consternation to everyone. The unconventional war between Ukraine and Russia has also become an eye-opener. On the global level, the actions of the Russian Federation have undermined the existing system of international relations, with Russia breaking all the rules. At the European level, the security of not only the EU’s neighbours has become jeopardised as Russia also made a number of threatening moves towards EU member states. While the inability of the EU to adequately respond to Russia with sufficient sanctions has prompted a reflection on the EU itself.

Firstly, Russian actions towards Ukraine have disrupted the system of international relations. In the centre of Europe in the 21st century, an EU strategic partner has breached the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords as well as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, where Russia was one of the parties that gave security guarantees to Ukraine. To achieve its goal, Russia has based its military intervention on expansionist arguments, such as protection of the Russian-speaking population and historical ties with Crimea. The global scale of precedent established by the Russian Federation suggests that any other state may attempt to adjust international law in accordance to its expansionist needs.

Any arms deal and its economic justification between EU member states and Russia are unacceptable.

Secondly, the military intervention in Ukraine was an eye-opener as far as Russia itself is concerned. The EU-Russia strategic relationship has been in stagnation for quite some time. The practice of the EU-Russian relations was correctly described by John Lough, an associate fellow at Chatham House, who said that it is about too little partnership and no strategy. The EU is now confronted not only with the aggression towards Ukraine, but also with numerous muscle-flexing violations of EU airspace by the Russian air force. In April, Russian TU-95 jets made control flights over the borders of the EU member states bordering the Northern Sea. In May and June, Finland reported Russian jets violating its airspace. In June, Russia conducted military drills in the Kaliningrad Region, placing S-300 air-defence missile systems in operation readiness, supported by the imitational exercises of SU-27 fighter jets. The exercise was concluded with airlifting of about 200 paratroopers and over 30 military vehicles, including infantry fighting vehicles BMD-2, armoured personnel carriers BTR-2, Kamaz and Ural Il-76 planes. Agreeably, these manoeuvres are vaguely the markings of a strategic and good neighbourly partnership. Therefore, the relationship with Russia should be seriously reconsidered.

Thirdly, the war in its neighbourhood gave the EU a possibility to reflect on itself. The EU has manifested obvious limitations which have derived from its inability to develop a common, strong and timely response to the Russian annexation of Crimea, its recurrent involvement in destabilising the east of Ukraine and numerous violations of EU airspace. Traditionally the biggest weaknesses of the EU are its inability to speak with one voice and the division of the member states over national energy, defence and security issues.

Divide and conquer

In the middle of the crisis, Russia strengthened bilateral ties and co-operation on the South Stream energy project with relevant EU members. The paradox of this project, which would cost the EU and Russia 40 billion US dollars, is that it is completely unnecessary. The existing transit routes supply the annual needs of the EU. Since 90 per cent of gas passes through Ukraine, it would not be wrong to conclude that the biggest motivation behind the South Stream project is to bypass and therefore punish Ukraine. Even though Russia started construction of the pipelines in 2012, the final bilateral agreements and visits of the Russian leadership to the EU states are being done now – during the largest and longest crisis in EU-Russia relations.

The EU institutions have tried to appeal to the member states, but some have ignored it. In April 2014, the European Parliament voted on a resolution against the construction of the South Stream pipeline. In June, the European Commission asked to suspend the building of this pipeline until Russia complies with EU regulations. While Bulgaria has followed this proposal, during a state visit to Austria, Vladimir Putin signed a bilateral agreement on South Stream with the Austrian president, Heinz Fischer. Strong support for South Stream is also expressed by Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, and even states in the pre-accession stage such as Serbia and Macedonia.

The rhetorical question is how the EU can trust Russia after all that has happened?

EU member states are equally divided over defence issue while prioritising a NATO-Russia agreement over the security interests of its eastern member states. NATO member states, which are de jure equal, are de facto unequal when it comes to protection. In the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, both parties agreed “to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe.” Fifteen years later, the security situation has changed. The latest developments show that security of the eastern EU and NATO states is threatened by the military manoeuvres in Kaliningrad and regular air space violations. Both EU solidarity and NATO’s Article 5 on collective self-defence are expected to be equally applied towards all the members, however, it is not the case, as the relocation of a permanent NATO base east of the Elba River is being blocked, mainly by Germany.

Another egregious example of prevailing national interests over common EU ones are bilateral arms deals between EU member states and Russia. The Mistral deal between France and Russia is the most sensational case. Signed by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2011, the deal was highly contested. Along with the innovative warship, France sold Russia NATO know-how without prior consultation with other members. Regardless of the arbitrage settlement and conflict with other member states, France has continued its Mistral business with Russia. This year, while the EU member states were having a heated debate about the third stage sanctions against Russia, a French port greeted 400 Russian sailors for a Mistral-class helicopter training. The mistral delivery to Russia is scheduled for the end of 2014. France explains that the consideration behind this co-operation has a strong economic component, but taking into consideration that Russia is managing an act of aggression against another European country – any arms deal between EU member states and Russia is unacceptable, while any economic justification of such deals in a time of war is ridiculous.

The final straw

On July 17th 2014, over the combat theatre in Ukraine, a civilian plane en route from Amsterdam to Kuala-Lumpur was shot down by an anti-aircraft missile near the Ukraine-Russia border. While there is no official report yet, some conclusions can be drawn already on who is the main suspect of this horrific crime. Firstly, the Ukrainian army did not use anti-aircraft systems, the other party did. Since the mercenaries did not have planes, the Ukrainian army did not use anti-aircraft missile systems. On the other side, the Ukrainian military forces were using bomber jets and other military planes. The aircraft were protecting the land army from columns of heavy armament vehicles which were regularly arriving from the Russian Federation to Ukraine.

Secondly, having believed that they had shot down a Ukrainian warplane, the mercenaries proudly announced it on their social media and this news was widely disseminated by the Russian media. Thirdly, the Ukrainian Security Services have both audio recordings of the mercenaries discussing bringing a Buk anti-aircraft system to Ukraine, hitting a plane and after the investigation of the plane debris reporting to their superiors that this happened to be a civilian plane with Indonesian and EU passports and not a Ukrainian warplane. The photo provided by the Ukrainian military shows the mercenaries having “hidden” the Buk in a residential area of one of the towns knowing that the Ukrainian jets will not bomb civilians.

Even though it is too early to make an assessment of the implications of this horrific act, what became clear to everyone is that this is a war – not a crisis, a civil war, or a “junta” punitive operation as the Russian authorities proclaim it to be. This is a war where Russia is the aggressor. The negotiations and peace talks which the EU has been trying to kindly suggest are not applicable within the given situation. If the EU pursues the path of negotiations, the EU will inspire and even enable Russia to enact its plan to create a protracted conflict in the east of Ukraine.

Therefore, the immediate task of the EU is to help Ukraine to conduct a full investigation. The EU should put all possible pressure on Russia to enact the peace plan proposed by Ukriane’s president, Petro Poroshenko. Vladimir Putin has already committed to it; however, it was never supported by concrete actions on Russia’s part.

The EU should draw a lesson from its shaky unity, which is constantly challenged by the national interests of individual states.

The Eastern Partnership, with all the financial and technical support, will be not effective unless the hybrid war is solved in Ukraine. However, the impact of the crisis is far from being regional. On a global level, the EU in co-operation with the United States, should strive for restoring the system of international relations where its actors are guided by the system of international law and principles. Ensuring global security as well as compliance with the international commitments would also reinforce the EU image as a promoter of democracy. The EU can coerce Russia by persistently imposing the third stage of sanctions in compliance with the Council Conclusions adopted on June 16th 2014.

Keep the faith

On the European level, the EU should rethink its relations with Russia as the latter has undermined its strategic status by assaulting Ukraine as well as by its military manoeuvres on the EU border. The rhetorical question is how the EU can trust and cooperate with Russia after all that has happened? Therefore, the EU should develop a new paradigm for its relations with Russia as soon as the security crisis is solved. The EU should draw a lesson from its shaky unity, which is constantly challenged by the national interests of individual states. The EU will continue to be weakened if the member states give priority to their own interests over the collective ones, especially during such a sensitive and crucial period as now.

With regards to defence capabilities, all EU and NATO members, regardless of their geographical position, should be protected equally. This is a question of basic equality and justice. Whereas the NATO military bases are situated in the West, it is the eastern and northern states that face the greatest threats. Guided by the EU principle of solidarity and NATO’s mutual aid, the request to have NATO permanent troops in the Baltic states and Poland should undergo serious consideration. The French-Russian Mistral deal should be unacceptable to both the EU and NATO. This case can be treated as a showcase on the growing gap between the national and EU interests and it should not recur in the future. At the same time, in the spirit of solidarity with an EU neighbour that is in a state of war with Russia, the European Council could impose a decision on France to suspend the delivery of Mistral based on the security and defence considerations of the union. Further, bilateral arms deals should be co-ordinated within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy.

Despite all that has happened in the past year, we must have faith that there is a future for the Eastern Partnership. Moreover, the future can be bright and prosperous under the condition that the current crisis situation is solved. As for now, the EU should put its efforts into helping the three states which have signed the Association Agreement to make the reform process a success story.

Ukraine has been and will continue to be the strongest pillar of the Eastern Partnership due to its size, geopolitics, energy transit routes, as well as the fact that it has set an example to other EaP countries. It is also a partner that needs EU support the most because of its worrisome financial situation and half-functional institutions soaked in endemic corruption. Ukraine’s new leadership has demonstrated a strong commitment to rigorous reforms with an aim to re-establish a state based on democratic principles and the rule of law. Therefore, the role of the EU in this process in not only to help Ukraine with financial support but also to help Ukrainian leadership in developing a realistic and feasible reform plan.

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski is a Polish politician and member of the European Parliament serving since 2004. He was vice president of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2007.